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Nietzsche is absent from today’s growing debate on slavery past and present. In this article I argue that 
his views on the subject add a pertinent, if challenging, dimension to this wide-ranging discussion. 
Nietzsche’s analysis is capable of contributing to our understanding of this multifaceted phenomenon in a 
number of respects. I look at Nietzsche’s use of the controversial notions of slavery, understood both 
historically and in the context of modern society, to explore such central concerns of political 
anthropology as the nature and role of leadership, and the questions of development and inequality. The 
key focus of Nietzsche’s examination concerns slavery as an enduring facet of human existence. He sees it 
becoming an important hallmark of the industrial culture as a barometer of modern society’s physiological 
well-being, as well as acting as the repository for its externalities. Nietzsche’s genealogical inquiry leads 
him to explore the psychological content of slavery and to conceptualise it in terms of human 
vulnerability, which increases susceptibility to exploitation. In these respects, Nietzsche’s views resonate 
with pertinence today and deserve closer critical attention and scrutiny – something Nietzsche would 
undoubtedly welcome. 
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It is difficult to underestimate the significance of Nietzsche’s discussion of slavery and 
exploitation within the context of his critique of the industrial culture of modernity.2 Huddleston 
notes that slavery remains a constant aspect of ‘Nietzsche’s thinking from his early essays (“The 
Greek State”) to his final works of 1888’ (Huddleston 2014: 146). Pursued throughout his oeuvre, 
this topology becomes a conduit for the critical examination of the pertinent questions of 
development and governance, as well as focusing on the problems of domination and inequality.  
Reflecting on the issues within the context of modernity, Nietzsche asserts that 
capitalism’s relationship with slavery does not come to an end with the abolition of slavery and 
that modern society, under the auspices of the industrial culture, engages in the ‘sublime 
development of slavery’.3 Meanwhile, the slavery, which had been abolished, continues to weigh 
on the modern consciousness as an unpaid and, possibly unrepayable, debt. 
By engaging with the challenging subject of slavery, Nietzsche develops a wide-ranging 
discussion concerning the ‘conditions of existence’ (Existenzbedingungen) – i.e. how we organise 
our lives and the ways in which we provide for our basic as well as more complex needs. 
Nietzsche’s concerns aim to encompass more complex social outcomes, which also include the 
issues of psychological well-being and mental health as well as the much-ignored question of 
spiritual versus material welfare.  
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Concerning the semiosis of slavery 
 
Nietzsche’s discussion on the semiosis of slavery is an important starting point. It enables him to 
draw a critical distinction between exploitation, as a more fundamental aspect of existential 
constitution, and slavery as being more epiphenomenal. In Nietzsche’s view, ‘life itself is, at its 
mildest, exploitation’ (BGE, §259).  
The primary aspect of exploitation Nietzsche gleans from the thinkers of antiquity is not 
the unfair appropriation of the results of another’s labour as its end.4 Rather, Nietzsche thinks of 
it is a modality of interaction between the qualitatively different and hierarchically ordered parts 
of the social whole, which allows not only for its preservation but also entails the potential for its 
enhancement, conceived in spiritual and cultural terms.  
Slavery, to borrow from Galbraith, becomes a ‘socially-modifying reference’, which 
grants a degree of ‘functional anonymity’ to exploitation (Galbraith 2004: 15).5 Nietzsche 
frequently speaks of the ‘metamorphoses of slavery’, which at one time ‘disguises itself under the 
cloak of religion’ and later ‘transfigures itself through morality’ (GOA6 XV, §402). 
On a linguistic level, Nietzsche concedes a fairly straightforward solution to the 
unsavoury sound of slavery. He accepts that the ‘word “slave” sets off the panic button within 
the modern consciousness (GSt:§1) and suggests that slavery can be discussed ‘under a more 
moderate name’ in a manner similar to the times when the word slavery ‘in no way seemed 
repugnant, let alone reprehensible’ (NF-1871:10[1]).7 
Nietzsche’s own use of Sklaverei to discuss the slavery of the Greek antiquity, as well as 
the ‘new world slavery’, is both technically Platonic (i.e. the ‘need for the one to speak of the 
many’) as well as posing an etymological challenge to the modern sensibility. Nietzsche is well 
aware that slavery of the Greek antiquity did not exist as a unified, generic phenomenon. In this 
respect, use of the term Sklaverei to discuss the phenomenon of slavery stretching across time 
and different cultures, as if slavery remained somehow unchanged, itself exhibits a certain 
propensity to being exploited.  
 
Concerning Nietzsche’s definition of slavery 
 
In Ancient Greek and Roman Slavery (2017), Peter Hunt argues that, historically, the definition of 
slavery has suffered from the same ‘imprecision and complexity’ which ‘affects many other key 
concepts and crafts that historians rightly consider crucial to their craft: capitalism, industrialism, 
the market economy, democracy, imperialism, law and others’ (Hunt 2017: 20).  
Nietzsche’s own definition of slavery is an important entry point into the wider 
discussion of the subject. In Human, All Too Human (1878), he provides the following criteria: ‘… 
he how does not have two-thirds of his day to himself is a slave, let him be what he may 
otherwise: statesman, businessman, official, scholar’ (HAH: Tokens, §283). 
He goes on to suggest that ‘true humanity demands that everyone be evaluated only in 
light of the condition’ in which one ‘discovers his higher self’ and not in that of ‘his working day 
unfreedom and servitude’ (HAH: I§624). As such, this formulation is only superficially about 
time. Although, as Huddleston notes, Nietzsche construes slavery ‘very broadly indeed’, his 
definition is not intended to be of the ‘catch-all’ variety (Huddleston 2014: 146).  
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Rather, Nietzsche’s statement hypothesises the inverse relationship between value-
creation and the modern ‘way of always keeping busy’ (D: III, §203), which forms part of his 
diagnosis of the modern condition. It is reflected in the ‘conscience of an industrious age’ that 
does not permit us to ‘bestow our best hours on art’, which counts only as ‘a recreational activity’ 
to which we devote the ‘remnants of our energy’ (HAH: WS§170). 
Our ‘busyness’ (Geschäftigkeit), which Nietzsche identifies with slavery, is symptomatic of 
a deeper pathology. It is, in a manner of speaking, a law of diminishing returns in that, today, it 
takes many more busy individuals, who are busier than ever before as well as from a much 
younger age than before, to create less and less of that which is valuable.8  
The flip-side of busyness appears no less problematic. Nietzsche warns us that 
‘industriousness … keeps silent about its dangers, its extreme dangerousness’ (GS§21). He 
ponders the reasons for why the slave might be – or should be – kept busy in the first instance, 
as well as what happens to the slave should he be “liberated” and cease to be busy? Is there a 
felicitous exit from the state of the ‘universal haste’ in which modern society immerses itself 
(UM: SE§4-5)? This line of inquiry entails a prescient warning concerning the longer-term 
consequences of “keeping busy” on the individual and collective well-being, understood in terms 
of spiritual and mental health (NF-1873:32[44]). 
 
Concerning the ‘higher men’ and ‘the order of rank’ 
 
Nietzsche often reflects upon a given phenomenon, social or otherwise, by inferring from its 
opposite (NF-1886:5[61]). This approach helps him to reverse conceptual and value inversions 
(NF-1887: 10[111]). In this respect, in order to understand Nietzsche’s ‘slave’, it is helpful to try 
and understand Nietzsche’s ‘higher man’ as well as visa versa.  
They appear similar in at least two respects. Most importantly, neither is ‘defined by 
origins of any kind’ (Klossowski 1969:158). Nietzsche suggests that the ‘primal source is the 
same in all men’ (NF-1871:12[1]). As such, his distinction does not derive from either of the (a) 
race9 (NF-1885:2[57]), (b) citizenship, nationality or statehood (NF-1885:37[8]), (c) heredity (NF-
1887:9[45]) or the ‘birth-right’10, (d) social status, (e) wealth, (f) gender,11 and (g) physical strength.12 
Instead, Nietzsche appears to have in mind a certain disposition, which although incorporated 
into the ‘origins’ and codified by them for a time, does not derive from the ‘origins’ and nor can 
it be sustained by them entirely (HAH:I§479).  
In his concluding published work, Ecce Homo (1888), Nietzsche makes it clear that ‘the 
word Übermensch designates a type of supreme well-being, in contrast to “modern” people, to 
“good” people, to Christians and other nihilists’ (EH: Good Books, §1). Pierre Klossowski points 
out that Nietzsche’s ‘great human being’ ‘lives within the unexchangeable’ and resists 
incorporation (Klossowski 1969: 158). Peter Sloterdijk reminds us of ‘Nietzsche’s decision thesis, 
namely that the history of humanity is yet to know real nobility’ (Sloterdijk 2000: 57-8).  
Secondly, the ‘higher and the lower spheres of life’ are inextricably connected and 
necessary for each other: ‘every atom affects the whole of being’ (NF-1888:14[79]) and the ‘work 
of ants’ is just as necessary as the ‘astonishing labours’ of genius ‘for the harmonious endurance 
of all that is human’ (HAH: II, VM§186). On multiple occasions, Nietzsche asserts that ‘the ruler 
and his subjects are of the same kind’ (NF-1885:40[21]) and the noble and the less noble ‘belong 
together and are of one species’ (HAH: I, §111). This cannot be understated, as the manner of 
their connection and the mode of their interactions reveal a great deal about the ‘conditions of 
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existence’ and the prevailing values within any given social arrangement. 
For Nietzsche, relationship between the ‘master’ and the ‘slave’ is not binary. Rather, 
these signifiers denote the farthest points on a broad spectrum of sensibility and character. Each 
is at least partly shaped by that against which and in opposition to which it is defined, as well as 
exerting similar defining influence upon its opposite (NF-1886:5[61]). In this respect, it is 
important to note that Nietzsche’s ‘order of rank’ is a highly nuanced concept, which he posits as 
a system of multiple natural degrees, as opposed to consisting of the unitary ‘opposites’, with which 
modernity prefers to operate on the basis that the ‘opposites’ are ‘easier to comprehend’ (NF-
1887:9[107]). In one of the final letters to Georg Brandes, penned in December 1888, Nietzsche 
writes about the ‘tremendously long ladder of ranking’, which alone can serve as the basis of 
natural ‘hierarchy between man and man’ (BVN-1888:1170). 
In Human, All Too Human (1878-80), Nietzsche posits a detailed outline of the spectrum 
of qualitative individual differences, which he uses to articulate the subtle degrees separating the 
ordinary from the great: 
 
We can distinguish five grades of traveller: those of the first and lowest grade are those 
who travel and, instead of seeing, are themselves seen – they are as though blind; next 
come those who actually see the world; the third experience something as a consequence 
of what they have seen; the fourth absorb into themselves what they have experienced 
and bear it away with them; lastly there are a few men of the highest energy who, after 
they have experienced and absorbed all they have seen, necessarily have to body it forth 
again out of themselves in works and actions as soon as they have returned home. It is 
like these five species of traveller that all men travel through the whole journey of life, 
the lowest purely passive, the highest those who transform into action and exhaust 
everything they experience. (HAH: vol.2, §228)13 
 
An important aspect to appreciate about the above passage is that all ‘five grades’ of passenger 
travel on exactly the same train through the journey of life. It is primarily, albeit not exclusively, 
in this sense, Nietzsche tells us, that all of the passengers are all precisely equal and necessary for 
one another: they share in the mutual vulnerability.14 
In a Nachlass note from 1887 titled On the Ranking, Nietzsche argues that the ‘higher man’ 
possesses a different, more acute and synthesizing sensibility, when compared to the ‘typical 
man’. The latter is able to process a ‘small corner’ of reality but cannot cope well when ‘the 
multiplicity of elements and the tension of opposites grows’ (NF-1887:10[111]). To the ‘calm of 
the strong soul, which moves slowly and displays an aversion to anything that is overhyped’, 
Nietzsche juxtaposes the anxiety of the ‘poor in spirit’ (NF-1884:26[75]), who is unable to deal 
with ‘an overwhelming abundance of what lives’ (NF-1886:7[7]).  
Equally, Nietzsche stresses the enormity of personal responsibility that lies squarely on 
the shoulders of the leaders in respect of their people: ‘he who commands must carry the burden 
of all who obey’, accepting the risk that the burden involved in commanding is always ‘an 
experiment and a hazard’ (SZ: Self-Overcoming). In Human, All Too Human, he argues that the task 
of producing ‘supreme cultural values’ at the same time means that ‘the inner life’ of the leaders 
is ‘so much harder and more painful’ (HAH:I,§480). 
Nietzsche sees this aptitude for responsibility as an irrefutable consequence of the ‘Die 
grossen Menschen’ being who they are. Greatness, first and foremost, ‘means giving direction’ 
(HAH:I,§521). Nietzsche’s conjecture is that they do not have a choice in the matter: they are 
‘compelled’ to it (NF-1887:11[286]). As such, ‘the higher man’ represents ‘the height of collective 




… it compels the individual to represent the pride of the whole ... he must speak and act 
with extreme respect for himself as he represents the community in person ... the 
responsibility for the whole draws and allows the individual a broad look, a stern and 
dreadful hand, a modesty and coldness and greatness of bearing, which he would not 
concede for his own sake. (NF-1887:11[286], #B-D)  
 
Nietzsche’s analysis underscores the intricacy and the vital importance of the connection 
between the ‘higher and the lower spheres of life’, between the noble and the slave, the great and 
the ordinary, the genius and the mediocre. He insists that the nature of this connection is neither 
economic nor financial in the first instance. Instead, it is a conduit for meaning-making and value 
creation, as well as a complex network of affects and relations by means of which meaning and 
values are shared throughout the social whole and can be jointly owned, whilst the 
responsibilities can be apportioned according to aptitude.15 
Developing this analysis further, Nietzsche argues that this connection between the 
‘spheres of nobility and the slaves’ (GM: Preface, §4) becomes irreparably distorted under the 
auspices of the ‘industrial culture’ of modernity to a large extent because this connection, as does 
slavery, becomes construed in essentially reductionist economic and financial terms. 
Nietzsche’s extensive discussion of the ‘order of rank’ provides an important entry point 
into his consideration of slavery as a psychological predicament. Through this concept, 
Nietzsche’s exploration of slavery also joins in the bigger conversation concerning the roots and 
causes of inequality. 
Nietzsche is comprehensively criticized for his ‘untenable naturalism’ and for the failure 
to supply a credible ‘legitimizing rationale’ to ‘support his theory of politics’ (Ansell-Pearson 
1994:41). Nonetheless, Nietzsche’s conjecture remains attention-worthy. He maintains that the 
underlying source of inequality is neither economic nor political. It is not an entirely 
manufactured outcome or an externally imposed constraint. Nor is it a consequence of specific 
institutional arrangements: ‘to be a public utility, a wheel, a function, for that one must be 
destined by nature: it is not society’ (TAC§57).  
Consequently, Nietzsche’s ‘underprivileged’ are not just the politically or economically 
underprivileged. (NF-1886:5[71], §8, §14). Instead, Nietzsche thinks of the ‘underprivileged’ in 
the context of the distinction between the more ‘whole human beings’ and the ‘ordinary people’.16 
In Beyond Good and Evil (1886), when discussing the ‘multitude’, he refers to them as 
‘unvollständigen Menschen’ in the sense of a psychological incompleteness (BGE§257-258).  
His argument problematises none other than the manner in which such underlying – 
psychological and physiological – differences between individuals become socialized and 
embedded into the structure of society, only to subsequently play out in the form of economic 
and political inequalities.17 Through the discussion of slavery, Nietzsche challenges the narrative 
on inequality as not being entirely truthful. 
 
Concerning the physiology and psychology of slavery 
 
Building on the logic that inequality is made manifest but does not arise exclusively from the 
social context, Nietzsche’s examination of slavery problematises it in terms of human 
vulnerability. Nietzsche argues that when the latter is stripped out from the oikonomic context of 
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‘mutual recognition of not causing harm’ (NF-1872:19[93]) and exposed in a depersonalised 
manner, it results in greater susceptibility to exploitation (GS§117). Nietzsche also problematises 
the slave as a vulnerability to be taken advantage of (HAH: WS§33).18 As Zarathustra notes, ‘he 
who cannot obey himself, will be commanded. That is the nature of living creatures’ (SZ: II, Self-
Overcoming). 
Genealogical aspects of Nietzsche’s inquiry into the root causes of slavery emphasise the 
latter as a particular physiological disposition, which translates into the psychological 
predicament and becomes ‘psychic suffering’ (GM: III, §16). Nietzsche emphasises the 
importance of getting the causation between physiology and psychology correctly: ‘If someone 
cannot cope with his ‘psychic suffering’, this does not stem from his psyche, to speak crudely; 
more probably from his stomach (GM: III, §16)’ 
Nietzsche’s claim is that beneath psychological distress, ‘certain weariness and heaviness’ 
and a ‘certain exhaustion’ are usually found, and that ‘the deep depression, the leaden fatigue and 
the black melancholy’ are rooted in ‘physiological feeling of obstruction and inhibition’ (Ibid.) 
The ‘true reason’ why the slave ‘feels ill’ is inevitably physiological, in Nietzsche’s assessment 
(GM: III, §15). However, ‘through lack of physiological knowledge’, the latter is dealt with as 
though ‘its “cause” and its cure can be sought and tested only on the psychological-moral level’ 
(GM: III, §16).  
As such, our understanding of the psychology of slavery as that which ‘happens in the 
head’ requires ‘a physiological elucidation and interpretation, rather than a psychological one’ 
(GM: I, §17). Our error is to interpret the underlying physiological deficiency as a psychological 
one, thereby inverting cause and effect and creating the framework where physiological 
incompleteness can be exploited as psychological vulnerability. 
Nietzsche tells us that individual’s valuations reveal something vital ‘about the structure 
of his soul’ (BGE: §268). His hypothesis is that the values of slave morality (e.g. humility, charity, 
pity, sympathy, kindness, equality) are not ‘good in themselves’ as much as they are ‘good for 
something’ (GM: Supplementary, I/96) – i.e. as ‘useful’ psychological ‘balms and ointments’ for a 
particular pathology (GM: III, §14). In this respect, Nietzsche finds the essence of slave morality 
to be thoroughly practical – it is to be found in its utility (BGE: §260). This utility and its value 
become the subjects of Nietzsche’s genealogical scrutiny. 
Nietzsche acknowledges that the slave possesses psychological richness and complexity 
(GM: I, §6-7). However, these qualities remain unfulfilled and incomplete, as they cannot be 
synthesised physiologically (NF-1887:10[111]; GM: III, §13-18). Ken Gemes notes that the 
slave’s immediate problem is the inability ‘to integrate that complexity into an active whole’ 
(Gemes 2001: 358). This inability to make sense of either his volatile psychological predicament, 
or of the ressentiment, which results from it, forms the nexus of slave’s vulnerability (Wallace 
2007:112-119).19  
Nietzsche suggests that the slaves’ ‘discontent with their lot was not invented entirely by 
the priests’ or by their masters (GM: III, §18) and that, at some level, it represents the 
physiological ‘essence of their miserable condition’ (D: III, §206) resulting from insufficient worth 
or wholesomeness.20 Deceitfulness serves to compensate for the incompleteness of one’s reality 
and manifests itself in ‘wishing not to see something that one does see; wishing not to see 
something as one sees it’ (TAC§55). It helps to complete the fragmentary nature of the slave’s 
sensibility: he has to borrow from the abstract in order to make his incomplete reality appear 
whole (GM: III, §18).21 In other words, a slave’s ‘physiological inhibition’ causes him to become 
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psychologically indebted. This is of critical significance in relation to the kind of valuations such 
individuals are capable of: 
 
… he does not understand the reverse side of things as necessary: he combats the evils as 
if one could dispute them … he does not want to accept the one goes hand in hand with 
the other and thus he wishes to obliterate: the typical character of a thing, a state, a time, 
a person, by endorsing only a part of their qualities and desiring to abolish all others. 
(NF-1887:10[111]) 
 
Looking deeper still, Nietzsche discerns a certain psychological propensity in the slave left to his 
own devices, to succumb to the ‘dull lethargy and the feeling of weakness’ growing from ‘his 
discontent, his aversion to himself’ (GM: III, §18). The herd instinct (‘Heerden-Instinkt’) as an 
inclination to aggregate in large numbers is another corollary of the same ‘pathological condition’ 
(GM: III, §18; NF-1882:3[1]). Increase in scale may represent a greater quantum of energy but it 
does not by itself amount to a different quality.  
Nietzsche argues that, left to its own devices, the herd remains directionless – always at 
the risk of the ever-present threat of inner disintegration (GM: III, §15) – and cannot ‘endure 
itself’ in the absence of leadership (NF-1885:2[179]). Already in Untimely Meditations (1873), 
Nietzsche suggests that the majority, who are ‘only servants, assistants, instruments’ – unable to 
self-direct and give themselves meaning – are ‘never happy in being what they really are’ (UM: 
SE, §6). 
As such, Nietzsche conceptualises slavery in the context of the fight against ‘the deep 
depression, the leaden fatigue and the black melancholy of the physiologically obstructed’ (GM: 
III, §15), including with the help of ‘a form of mechanical activity’. The latter is seen as not only 
providing temporary relief but as a necessary means to lift the slave ‘out of his most personal 
element in his discontent’ by ‘completely diverting the interest of the sufferer from the pain’ and 
providing him with a sense of certainty, ‘a certain encouragement, and indeed some discipline to 
forget himself’ (GM: III, §18). 
Within these parameters, it becomes possible to see that Nietzsche’s discussion of slavery 
as an inquiry into the human physiological incompleteness and psychological vulnerability or lack 
thereof, understood both individually and collectively. It is conceptualised by Nietzsche in the 
sense of one’s ability to self-direct, to self-legislate and to give oneself values, or – in other words 
– the ability to create. Absence of such synthetic sensibility exposes psychological vulnerability, 
which is taken advantage of and which becomes imbedded into the social fabric of society.  
Nietzsche contends that ‘the master of the weaker becomes stronger to the extent that 
the weaker cannot assert its degree of autonomy’ (NF-1885:36[18]). In this context, the questions 
of how and by whom this vulnerability-by-incompleteness is taken advantage of, Nietzsche 
argues, illuminate some of the more telling characteristics of the nature of a particular society, its 
driving forces and trajectory, as well as the value of its future. 
Certain parallels can be drawn between Nietzsche’s discussion of slavery as a 
psychological disposition and the concept of a ‘strange loop’ in the sense of forming an 
inescapable predicament. By analogy to Escher’s famous lithograph of the Drawing Hands, 
Douglas Hofstadter defines the strange loop22 as:  
 
an abstract loop in which, in the series of stages that constitute the cycling-around, there 
is a shift from one level of abstraction (or structure) to another, which feels like an 
upwards movement in a hierarchy, and yet somehow the successive “upward” shifts turn 
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out to give rise to a closed cycle. That is, despite one’s sense of departing ever further 
from one’s origin, one winds up, to one’s shock, exactly where one had started out. In 
short, a strange loop is a paradoxical level-crossing feedback loop’ (Hofstadter 
2007:110). 
 
Nietzsche argument suggests that the “Circe” of slave morality – ‘the most vicious form of the 
will to lie’ (NF-1888:23[3]) – completes a similarly ‘strange loop’. This trajectory starts with re-
positioning of the slave’s discontent with oneself – rooted in the slave’s physiological 
incompleteness – as though it were an injustice perpetrated from without – i.e. by external 
causes: ‘I suffer: someone or other must be guilty’ (GM: III, §15). The cause-effect relationship 
becomes inverted and a new lens of abstraction through which the world can be interpreted is 
created (NF-1872:19[204]). 
The slave’s physiological incompleteness becomes psychologised through the slave 
morality. The problem, as far as Nietzsche is concerned, is that slave morality, having started 
with false premises, ultimately falls short in delivering on its promises. It is unable to dispel, to 
break or to overcome the original predicament it sets out by exposing and denouncing. Instead, 
the slave morality completes the loop by normalising the inescapable and unalterable 
predicament by referencing it vis-à-vis itself (GM: III, §15). The secret of its success is that the 
strange loop reverts back to the subject who has undergone significant psychological 
reconfiguration ‘at the freezing point of the will’ (HAH: II, VM, §349), such that he can no 
longer sense this because now he dwells in the ‘self-created world of opinions’ growing out of 
‘specific moral values’ (NF-1884:26[75]).23 Zarathustra warns that ‘even a prison’ of slave 
morality will ‘seem like bliss’ to the ‘restless people’, who can ‘enjoy their new security’ in its 
inescapable nets (SZ: IV, The Shadow). 
In the end, slave morality can do no more than to deliver the slave to a place where ‘all 
are slaves and equal in slavery’ (NF-1887:11[341]), so that he can make peace with that which he 
cannot escape. Nietzsche conjectures that ‘no one talks more passionately about his rights that 
he who in the depth of his soul doubts whether he has any’ (HAH: I,§597). The purpose of slave 
morality is not to transform the slave into the master (of himself) but rather to ease the pain of 
his discontent with himself and to make the slave embrace himself as he is – the slave.24  
In Untimely Meditations, Nietzsche tells us that ‘culture is the child of each individual’s … 
dissatisfaction with himself’ (UM: SE§6). The ‘last man’, however, according to Nietzsche, is he 
who is ‘no longer able to despise himself’ and consequently no longer knows of either love or 
creation (SZ: Prologue, §5). In a Nachlass note from 1881, Nietzsche asserts that the inability to 
feel dissatisfaction with oneself – the desire to accept oneself as one is with all the ‘limitations of 
the “I” as though they were cause for celebration – is the hallmark of ‘industrial and utilitarian 
culture’ (NF-1881:11[50]). 
 
Concerning the abolition of slavery 
 
One of the places where this becomes evident is Nietzsche’s discussion of the abolition of 
slavery. Nietzsche engages with the issue over an extended period of time.25 In The Wanderer and 
His Shadow (1880), he makes clear his opposition to ‘physical and spiritual enslavement’ as forms 
of pestilence and barbarism (HAH: WS§275). 
Increasingly, however, his writing on the subject reveals a degree of exasperation with the 
hypocrisy which surrounds this landmark development. Nietzsche challenges the abolition of 
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slavery on two grounds. The first is the issue of intellectual honesty, a charge he first levies 
against the Alexandrian culture’s denials of the necessity of slavery:  
 
The Alexandrian culture, to be able to exist permanently, requires a slave class, but with 
its optimistic view of life it denies the necessity of such a class, and consequently, when 
its beautifully seductive and tranquillising utterances about the ‘dignity of man’ and the 
‘dignity of labour’ are no longer effective, it gradually drifts toward a dreadful 
destruction. (BT: #18) 
 
Subsequently, in Human, All Too Human (1878), Nietzsche adds to his argument by intimating 
that ‘everyone who desires the abolition of slavery and abominates the idea of reducing people to 
this condition … must at the same time realise that slaves live in every respect more happily and 
in greater security than the modern worker’, whilst ‘the work done by slaves is very little work 
compared with that done by the “worker” ‘ (HAH: The State, §457).  
Last but not least, in one of his final published works, The Case of Wagner (1888), 
Nietzsche elaborates his position further. He speaks about the abolition of slavery in terms of 
‘the instinctive uncleanliness in relation to oneself’, and the unwillingness ‘to gain clarity in 
relation to oneself’. These comments form the basis upon which Nietzsche chastises the German 
Kaiser: ‘At this very moment the German Kaiser calls it his Christian duty to liberate the slaves 
in Africa’ (CW:§3). 
To Nietzsche, the triumph of value inversion would be to consider using the most 
enslaving instrument there is to liberate the enslaved. This position is consistent with Nietzsche’s 
earlier note from the Nachlass, where he considers the abolition of slavery to belong in the same 
conceptual amalgam as Christianity, as ‘the ostentatious words for something completely 
different (yes, the contrary!)’ (NF-1887:11[135]).  
As such, Nietzsche problematises the notion of the ideal (e.g. the abolition of slavery) by 
suggesting that the latter usually stands for the ‘slandering and re-baptising’ of old values (NF-
1887:9[173]).26 In the case of Christianity, as Ronald Osborn points out in Humanism and the Death 
of God (2017), ‘the fact that Christianity was deeply complicit from the beginning in the projects 
of European colonialism, slavery and imperialism’, gives potency to Nietzsche’s comprehensive 
challenge of value-inversion, which appears to spearhead modernity’s drive for liberation and 
progress (Osborn 2017:212-213). 
Nietzsche’s second and related objection to the abolition of slavery comes from the 
viewpoint of total cost that would be involved in overcoming slavery in more than just the name. 
Stated briefly, Nietzsche understands the total cost in the meaning of ‘total accounting’ as 
expressing ‘the sum total of all costs and sacrifices’ of achieving a stated objective (HAH: I, §475, 
§481).27 Nietzsche’s question to the proponents of the abolition of slavery can be formulated in 
the following way: has slavery been overcome with its abolition, or simply made more invisible 
and deeper embedded into the modern psyche?  
Nietzsche’s contention is that modern sensibility, more intolerant of the word ‘slavery’ 
than of its reality, is only informed by slavery as a recent historical phenomenon. The word 
‘slavery’ is itself a relatively recent etymological phenomenon, dating from the Middle Ages. That 
slavery which has been abolished was, according to Nietzsche, nothing but the ‘slavery of the 
barbarians’ (NF-1869:3[44]). It was the slavery of the slaves, by the slaves and over the slaves 
and, as such, it could not have been anything but ugly, and reprehensible, because, and this is 
critical for Nietzsche, ‘there were never slaves without masters’ (NF-1881:16[23]).  
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Nietzsche suggests that the significance of the abolition of slavery does not derive 
primarily from the sense of a great victory over a heinous evil. Rather, the great tragedy and the 
direct evidence of our ethical degeneration is precisely that such slavery that was abolished had 
ever been allowed to come to pass in the first instance. As such, abolishing slavery has little to do 
with overcoming it. What is worse, in Nietzsche’s view, is that the abolition only removes the 
real causes of this barbaric slavery further from the modern mind’s eye. 
Under the surface of a rousing but inevitably self-subsuming and self-referential ‘battle 
cry’ – ‘the alleged tribute to human dignity’ (NF-1887:9[173]) – the abolition of slavery also 
conceals the reality, which is neither disinterested nor benign, and nor does it represent 
substantive progress in relation to the underlying conditions of existence. Nietzsche warns us 
that ‘these great words have value only in battle, as a standard: not as realities’ (NF-
1887:11[135]). 
Abolition of slavery, in his view, is spearheaded by the ‘will to one morality’, which 
manifests itself in the drive to increasing uniformity serving the ‘interest of profitability’ (NF-
1887:10[11]). Part of this process involves slavery being reconfigured into an economic 
phenomenon and being found wanting on that score. Paradoxically, the abolition of slavery has 
made it easier to exploit the “liberated” slaves, including by vastly increasing their numbers and 
thereby diluting the “unit cost” of producing a worker. As Adam Smith pointed out already in 
The Wealth of Nations (1776), ‘the work done by freemen comes cheaper in the end than that 
performed by slaves’ (Smith 1852: 34). As a form of exploitation, slavery is found to be not 
economically viable. Hence, it is abolished.  
Nietzsche points out one further aspect of intellectual dishonesty that presides over the 
abolition of slavery. He warns that, under the cover of the ‘seductive and tranquilising 
utterances’, unavoidably hides ‘a very particular kind of man’, who ‘tries to gain mastery – more 
precisely, a very particular instinct’ (NF-1887:9[173]). In the antecedent note, Nietzsche 
characterises this instinct as ‘the dark instincts of those men of a democratic era who are 
dissatisfied, ambitious, disguised from themselves’ (NF-1887:9[170]). He goes on to suggest that 
a particular ‘lust for power’ urges these men on and finds reflection in the agenda of the ‘equality 
of men’: 
 
‘Equality of men’: what is hidden behind the tendency more and more to posit men as 
equal simply because they are men. ‘Interestedness’ in respect to common morality (the 
trick: making the great desires avarice and lust for power into patrons of virtue). (NF-
1887:9[173]) 
 
In other words, Nietzsche seeks to establish a direct link between the economic logic of profit-
making and the abolition of slavery: ‘common morality is enforced only because it procures a 
benefit’ (NF-1887:9[170]). Nietzsche notes that the liberated slaves ‘should cease to be 
differentiated … in their needs and demands – more clearly: that they are going to wither’ (NF-
1887:9[173]). He equates this with ‘the tyranny … or uniformity in favour of the rulers’, which 
only alleges ‘a tribute to “human dignity” but never intends for it to materialise (Ibid.). This note 
from late Nachlass leaves little doubt in relation to whom Nietzsche considers as the prime 
beneficiaries of such a reconfiguration:  
 
How far all kinds of businessmen and the avaricious, all those who have to grant and 
request credit, need to insist on sameness of character and sameness of value concepts: 
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world trade and exchange of all kinds enforces and, as it were, buys itself virtue. The 
same classes make use of immorality whenever that serves their purpose. (NF-
1887:9[173]) 
 
As such, and beyond the echo of the ‘battle cry’, the abolition of slavery has little to do with 
some progressive moral epiphany and more with perpetuating more subtle forms of ‘impersonal 
and anonymous slavery’ (HAH: WS§288). Could it be, therefore, that through its abolition, 
slavery has simply been transitioned into a less tangible form and given a different name? In On 
the Genealogy of Morality (1887), Nietzsche insists that this kind of ‘meaning-name’ inversion is, in 
fact, the case with the phenomenon in question, which has to be ‘adorned with such inoffensive 
names that they do not arouse the suspicion of even the most delicate hypocritical 
consciousness’ (GM: II, §7).  
Turning briefly to the present day in order to illustrate Nietzsche’s point, Anti-Slavery’s 
International28 warning resonates tellingly: ‘Modern slavery is inflicted on millions of people all 
over the world. But often it’s not called slavery, and many people don’t even know it exists’. Part 
of the reason for this is that, today, slavery is often referred to by other names. “Human 
trafficking” and “bonded labour” are arguably easier on the ear than slavery, even though in 
substance it is a ‘form of slavery’ and ‘the fastest growing means by which people are forced into 
slavery’, whereas bonded labour is ‘the most widespread yet least known form of modern 
slavery.29 The United Nations protocols define human trafficking as the 
 
recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons, by means of the 
threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, 
of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or … of a person having control 
over another person, for the purpose of exploitation. Exploitation shall include, at a 
minimum … forced labour or services, slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude 
…30 
 
One characteristic, which many of the texts dealing with modern slavery highlight, is the issue of 
vulnerability. As Mary Cunneen, director of Anti-Slavery International, points out concerning the 
most likely slavery targets, ‘what all these people have in common is that they are vulnerable and 
suffer the worst forms of exploitation’ (van den Anker 2004: viii).  
Inability to overcome slavery as a requirement and profiteering from it instead is a 
distinguishing feature of modernity, in Nietzsche’s view, and whilst ‘the glitter of general 
disinterestedness dazzles’, it also ‘conceals the knavery and harshness’ (HAH: I, §443). In other 
words, Nietzsche sees modern slavery as developing on the cross-roads of exploitation and the 
profit-logic, which becomes the motive force of the capitalist economy.31 As Holub aptly 
observes, ‘the ideology-laden platitudes of democracies only conceal the basic economic nexus of 
slavery’ (Holub 2018:144). 
The increase in the scale of capitalist exploitation may have helped to take the “sting” out 
of the more naked forms of this exploitation, so that it has become more benign on the mind’s 
eye. Zarathustra warns us, however, that it is always ‘the invisible hands that torment and bend 
us the worst’ (SZ: I, Tree on the Mountainside).  
In The Half Has Never Been Told (2014), Edward Baptist develops an empirically-based 
argument concerning the critical role of both slave labour and slave trade in the development of 
American capitalism.32 He deconstructs the accepted wisdom verified until recently by the ‘stamp 
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of academic research on the idea that slavery was separate from the great economic and social 
transformations of the Western world during the nineteenth century’ (Baptist 2014: xix).  
Baptist provides numerous examples of the unsavoury origins of modern global finance. 
One of them demonstrates how “commodified slaves”, turned into the widely traded 
international financial securities and collateral in the 1820-1830s, were the real-life prototype of 
the modern financial products, such as mortgages (Baptist 2014: 248, 270). Elsewhere, in Slavery’s 
Capitalism (2016), Beckert and Rockman find that, in parts of Louisiana, South Carolina, slave 
mortgages regularly ‘generated more circulating capital in a given year than did the revenues from 
crops produced by slave labor’ (Beckert and Rockman 2016: 17).33 
Slaves-based mortgages remained the popular and attractive long-term financial 
investment at the time when the concept and the practice of slavery were becoming increasingly 
politically and socially unacceptable either side of the Atlantic: 
 
In effect, even as Britain was liberating the slaves of its Empire, a British bank could … 
sell an investor a completely commodified slave: not a particular individual who could 
die or run away, but a bond that was the right to a one-slave-sized slice of pie made from 
the income of thousands of slaves. (Baptist 2014: 248) 
 
Baptist argues persuasively that capitalist economy and capitalism, as the social order in America 
as well as in Britain and elsewhere in Europe, rose on the back of slave trade, slave labour and 
slave finance. Echoing Nietzsche’s own conclusions, he also points out that slavery tends to 
become increasingly brutal in its forms when it becomes pursued for profit.  
Prominent American sociologist William Edward Burghardt Du Bois, in his famous 
book Darkwater: The Twentieth Century Completion of Uncle Tom’s Cabin (1920), which chronicles the 
horrors of black slavery in America in the early part of the 20th century, problematises the 
tragedy of slavery the following probing question: 
 
We ask, and perhaps there is no answer, how far may the captain of the world’s industry 
do his deeds despite the grinding tragedy of its doing? How far may men fight for the 
beginning of comfort, out beyond the horrid shadow of poverty, at the cost of starving 
other and what the world calls lesser men? (Du Bois 1920:91) 
 
Nietzsche tells us slavery has not been overcome with abolition. Rather, its exterior appearance 
has changed. In a certain respect, Nietzsche’s argument echoes that delivered by the US District 
Judge, Edward Coke Billings, in the famous 1873 address on the ‘The struggle between 
civilisation of slavery and that of freedom’:  
 
You have destroyed the visible temple of a gross heathen deity; but the heathen idolatry 
has survived the destruction of its palpable shrine. You have abolished slavery; but you 
have not destroyed the civilization—the moral and social ideas, born of slavery; nor can 
you destroy them save by the added ameliorations and incisions …34 
 
Fast forwarding to today once again, it is worth noting that Anti-Slavery International repeats 
Nietzsche’s conclusions: ‘Slavery did not end with abolition in the 19th century. Instead, it 
changed its forms and continues to harm people in every country in the world.’35 Zarathustra’s 
prescient words are worth keeping in mind: ‘Do you call yourself free? I want to hear your ruling 
idea and not that you have escaped from a yoke’ (SZ: I, Creator). 
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Concerning capitalism and modern slavery 
 
Capitalism actively reconfigures the concept of slavery. As is cogently argued in the examination 
of the ‘diverse and heterogenous’ roles of slavery in the New Frontiers of Slavery (2016), redesigning 
slavery has undoubtedly been ‘an integral aspect of the “great transformation’, modernity, and 
capitalist development’ (Tomich 2016: 2). In Human, All Too Human (1878), Nietzsche notes that 
‘as at all times, so now too, men are divided into the slaves and the free’ (HAH: Tokens, 
§283,132). 
What does Nietzsche suggest happens to slavery in modernity? Part of his concern is 
with the travails of an “old foe” – principium individuationis, which he tracks from Socrates and 
through its various reincarnations to modernity. Nietzsche tells us ‘the very isolated individual of 
the modern age is made too weak and bound to fall into servitude’ (NF-1869:3[44]).  
Capitalism advances by teaching such an individual ‘to see boredom as though lit up by a 
higher charm’ so that the ‘mechanical form of existence’ would appear ‘as the highest, most 
venerable form of existence’ (NF-1887:10[11]). Nietzsche surmises that the modern individual 
‘regards himself as free’ largely because ‘he no longer perceives the weight of the chains’ (HAH: 
WS§10). At the same time, however, the real motive forces, which calibrate the moral 
imperatives of the industrial culture so as to ensure self-advancement – namely those of 
‘profitability, amusement and expediency’ – remain hidden from view (NF-1887:10[11]). 
A critical point Nietzsche makes is that commercial society now engages the vocabulary 
of equality, dignity and freedom in order to foster the ‘sublime development of slavery’ (NF-
1885:2[179]), which, beneath the platitudes of the liberatory vernacular (HAH: I, §443), also 
involves taking full advantage of the slave’s psychological vulnerability, which is amplified by 
moulding and controlling subjectivity of the labourer in such a way that ‘labour becomes 
indistinguishable from “work on the self” ‘ (Lazzarato 2011: 33). In this context, Nietzsche 
problematises modern slavery as becoming primarily an ‘impersonal enslavement’ (D: Book III, 
§206). 
Modern slavery becomes less visible at least in two respects. Slavery’s physical 
manifestations become outsourced beyond the perimeter of the western world wherefrom 
slavery continues to be a logical choice of the capitalist system as providing a necessary cost-
effective boost to the capitalist economy, so that the latter can continue to thrive.36 Within the 
perimeter, however, slavery does not perish either: it becomes increasingly internalised into the 
multiplicity of drives, which become diffused throughout the fabric of the consumer society.  
Focus on the enslaving propensities of industrial culture is central to Nietzsche’s critique. 
On one hand, Nietzsche correctly anticipates the emergence of the consumer society that would 
become enslaved by the incessant ‘satisfaction of its own needs’ (Klossowski 1969: 158). As 
Nietzsche’s argument goes, ‘the greedy exploitation of every minute brings forth … the self-
seeking drives of the soul’, leaving ‘all men’ feeling ‘in themselves only the self-seeking worm’ 
(UM: SE, §4). Yet, at the same time, this ‘worm’ – emblematic of the ‘commercial culture’ – is of 
the kind that remains ‘eternally hungry’ and dissatisfied ‘no matter how much it devours’, in the 
sense, which Nietzsche first invokes in The Birth of Tragedy (BT: §23). 
Helping to embed this ‘commercial culture’ structurally is the comprehensive political 
drive for ‘equalization … in the guise of democratization practiced by industrial society’ 
(Klossowski 1969: 165). One concomitant effect of the equalisation drive, which entitles 
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everyone to ‘believe they have the right to any problem’ (NF-1884:25[298]) is an unavoidable 
increase in the levels of ‘anxiety’ (HAH: WS, §170) and ‘agitatedness’ (Ibid.: vol.1, §285). The 
‘extreme movement’ of modern civilisation ‘in terms of speed and means’ (NF-1888:14[182]) 
helps to deliver the agitated and anxious individuals into the therapeutic lap of the consumerist 
cycle, thereby reinforcing the “vicious circle”, which ‘implies, for Nietzsche, a reduction of the 
human being’ (Klossowski 1969: 165-67). The latter, as we can infer from Nietzsche’s argument, 
occurs in proportion to the ever-expanding (i.e. inflationary) periphery of the industrial culture.  
These two intertwined and mutually reinforcing trends – consumption and agitated 
anxiety – promote the ‘universally enslaving economy’ of industrial culture (Klossowski 
1969:165). Nietzsche argues that such social arrangement is attainable only at a very high, albeit 
for a long time invisible, cost. Behind the symptoms discussed above, Nietzsche hypothesizes a 
far deeper process of ‘physiological decline’, the final destination of which would be to ‘turn the 
Earth into a hospital’ (NF-1886:4[7]). I contend that Nietzsche’s warning concerns the 
impending mental health crisis (NF-1888:14[182]), which is also aptly captured by Klossowski: 
 
Nietzsche has the irrefutable premonition: the total effacement of differences in the 
satisfaction of needs and the homogenization of the habits of feeling and thinking will 
have, as its effect, a moral and affecting numbing … the human being will no longer feel 
itself; nor its substance, nor its power – even though it will henceforth be capable of 
exploiting other planets (Klossowski 1969: 165). 
 
As a result, modern individuals become enslaved through the absence of formal slavery. They 
find it difficult to carry on with their daily lives, which entail an inscrutable contradiction of 
living enslaved – what Klossowski refers to as ‘congenital servitude’ (Ibid.,157) – although, 
superficially, they do not consider themselves to be slaves.  
An inference that can be drawn from Nietzsche’s multipronged analysis of modern 
slavery, therefore, appears to be that the ‘atomistic individuals’ (NF-1882:4[83]) – no matter how 
free, equal and dignified – should encounter increasing difficulty in regarding their existential 
condition (HAH: WS§209). Already in The Greek State (1872), Nietzsche warned of a potentially 
‘enormous social problem’: ‘even if it were true that the Greeks were ruined because they kept 
slaves, the opposite is even more certain, that we will be destroyed by the lack of slavery’ (GSt: 
§6). This, Nietzsche intimates, is liable to become a point of colossal psychological stress and a 
mental fracture from which the tremendous anxiety of the modern age would rise to the point 
where ‘the burden of living becomes too heavy’ (HAH: II, VM§401). 
Nietzsche’s analysis also suggests that capitalism reconfigures the slave by disrupting his 
psychological habitat so as to expand the commercial reach of slavery and to sweep far greater 
numbers, including the former masters, into the fold of the slave morality, which in its 
secularized form gains ascendancy within the precepts of industrial culture, which include both 
the discourse on democracy as well as the doctrines of economic liberalism.37 This is partly the 
reason why Nietzsche insists that ‘the slave-like character of morality … continually generates 
new forms of similar slavery’ (NF-1884:25[163]). 
Perhaps the crucial reason why Nietzsche finds modern slavery as disagreeable as he 
does is the degradation of the ‘Die grossen Menschen’ into Carlyle’s ‘Captains of Industry’ and 
Spencer’s ‘regulative, ruling and employing classes’.38 Whilst the latter may well declare as their 
‘first ambition’ to be ‘a noble master, among noble Workers’ to which the desire ‘to be a rich 
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Master’ is explicitly subordinated39, in Nietzsche’s view, they fail to become commensurate with 
the exacting demands of the ‘Die grossen Menschen’. 
Nietzsche finds the ‘luminaries of industry’ fundamentally deficient and ‘faking 
leadership’. He likens them to the ‘blood sucking dogs, speculating on misery of every kind’, 
whilst advancing their self-interest (GS: §40). Elsewhere, he describes them as ‘only slaves, who 
lie … about their slave-like nature and work’ (NF-1881:16[23]).  
In Ecce Homo (1888), Nietzsche tells us that ‘the decadents need the lie as it is one of the 
conditions of their preservation’ (EH: BT, §2) but with perilous consequences for the rest: ‘all 
the problems of politics, of social organisation, and of education have been falsified through and 
through because one mistook the most harmful men for great men’ (EH: Clever, §10).  
When the ‘leaders of humanity’ (NF-1888:23[3]) become decadent, ‘exoteric’ in their 
outlook (BGE:§30) and ‘intestinal’ (UM: SE§4; RWB§6) in their modus operandi, while those ‘in 
the lower spheres of the world’, who are of the ‘weaker soul’ and ‘lower life force’ (BGE§30) are 
left to their insufficient own devices – the entirety of the social whole suffers a loss of value and 
degenerates whilst impersonal enslavement flourishes: ‘Material prosperity, the comfort that 
satisfies the senses, is now desired, and all the world wants it above all else. Consequently, it will 
meet a spiritual slavery that never before existed (NF-1881:11[294], o.t.).’ 
The ‘conditions of existence’, which embody and reflect these values make it neigh 
impossible for the great individuals to emerge. In this respect, Nietzsche notes that ‘the 
degeneration of the rulers has created the greatest madness in history’ (NF-1884:25[344]). In the 
words of Zarathustra: 
 
There is no harder misfortune in all human destiny than when the powerful of the earth 
are not also the first men. Then everything becomes false and awry and monstrous. … 
then the value of the rabble rises higher and higher and at last the rabble-virtue says: 
Behold, I alone am virtue! (SZ: IV, Kings) 
 
This paves the way for the proliferation of meaningless and wasteful slavery, which engulfs all 
social classes and every sphere of life. This, Nietzsche’s argument suggests, makes slave morality 
not only a potent economic force but also ‘the greatest danger’ (GM: I,§12), as it all but confirms 
us moderns as ‘the last man, and the slave’ (EH: Destiny, §5). 
Nietzsche foresees the eventual ‘mechanisation of mankind’ as a function of the ‘total 
economic administration of the earth’. He argues, however, that absent the worthy – the ‘What 
For and Whither To – the ‘maximum point of exploitation’ will always correspond to the 
‘minimal forces’, ‘minimal values’ and the most dwarfish of individuals, no matter how free they 
may imagine themselves. Hence, Nietzsche’s stark conjecture that ‘the theory of freedom of will 
is an invention of the ruling classes’ (HAH: WS§9). 
Unable to supply value and meaning, the modern ‘captains of industry’ are more likely to 
perpetuate slavery so long as it continues to assist in advancing their interests.40 Perpetuation of 
slavery, however, is not consequence free. The latter may accrue out of sight for a time and up to 
a point where incremental improvements in material well-being can no longer provide a bona fide 
substitute for spiritual and mental well-being (HAH: II, VM, §317). Nietzsche posits this as a 
central concern in relation to the industrial culture of modernity: 
 
It is clear that what I am fighting is economic optimism: the idea that everyone’s profit 
necessarily increases with the growing costs to everyone. It seems to me that the reverse 
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is the case: the costs to everyone add up to a total loss: man becomes less – so that one 
no longer knows what this tremendous process was actually for. A ‘What for’, a new 
‘What for’ – that is what mankind needs. (NF-1887:10[17]) 
 
Nietzsche’s analysis of modern slavery can be read as a cautionary tale about the high price the 
invisible costs – known as ‘externalities’ in economic speak – can and do exact: ‘we pay the 
highest price for any one-sided preference’ (HAH:II, VM, §186). One such ‘one-sided 
preference’ is manifest in the universally enslaving propensities of the industrial culture, which 
defines progress in terms of indefinite economic growth under the mantra of profit 
maximisation. Nietzsche’s reflections on slavery problematise the comprehensive hollowing-out 
of human spirit and the diminution of the individual’s worth as the true cost we incur on such 
developmental trajectory, which to him is the most regrettable squandering of energy and 
resources. He notes that the energy ‘by which the mills of the modern world were driven’ comes 
first and, and only then, and a long way after, the truth’ (HAH: II, VM§226), which exposes 
‘progress’ as the ‘retrograde movement’ (Ibid., §178) and a ‘secret path of decline’ (BGE: §10). 
In a related sense, slavery, according to Nietzsche, could never make purely economic 
sense, which becomes its conceptual designation under the auspices of industrial culture.41 
Nietzsche, therefore, urges us to bring back into the picture the hidden costs and contingent 
liabilities of the industrial culture. He insists that they must be brought onto the ‘balance sheet of 
life’ (NF-1875:5[188]) in order for us to be in a position to have a meaningful and honest 
discussion about the state of society, its developmental trajectory and its future prospects. In this 
context, slavery becomes important in the sense of acting as a repository where the invisible 




Nietzsche contends that, throughout human history, slavery has never disappeared. He is 
confident that slavery will remain rooted in existence long after ‘our social order will slowly melt 
away’ (HAH: I, §443). In the Nachlass note from 1881, Nietzsche insists that ‘slavery is 
universally present, although no one wishes to admit it’ (NF-1881:11[221]). The persistent 
denials and misconstruals of slavery have only had the effect of fortifying it and incorporating it 
deeper into the social fabric.  
This process of incorporation entails, in Nietzsche’s view, a comburent danger in so as 
far as modern slavery acts as a mirror in which modern consciousness and conscience reflect. It 
brings up the following acute predicament:  
 
The entire past of the old culture was erected upon force, slavery, deception, error; but 
we, the heirs and inheritors of all these past things cannot decree our own abolition and 
may not wish away a single part of them (HAH: I, §452).  
 
Referring to the modern state in Thus Spoke Zarathustra (1883-85), Nietzsche alleges that 
‘whatever it has it has stolen’ (SZ: New Idol). According to Nietzsche, this presents a twofold 
issue of evaluating such history and deciding how to move on from it.  
In Slavery’s Capitalism (2016), Beckert and Rockman elaborate on the problematic aspects 
of the dilemma posited by Nietzsche: 
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A scholarly revolution over the past two decades … has recognized slavery as the 
foundational American institution, organizing the nation’s politics, legal structures, and 
cultural practices with remarkable power to determine the life chances of those moving 
through society as black or white. An outpouring of scholarship … leaves little doubt 
that the new United States was a “slaveholding republic.” In comparison, only a small 
segment of recent scholarship has grappled with the economic impact of slavery. Only in 
the past several years has scholarship on finance, accounting, management, and 
technology allowed us to understand American economic development as “slavery’s 
capitalism.” And only now is there enough momentum to leverage some basic facts … 
into a fundamental rethinking of American history itself. (Beckert and Rockman 2016: 2-
3) 
 
Beckert and Rockman’s assessment resonates with a number of earlier notable studies. In a 2004 
article in the Harvard BlackLetter Law Journal titled ‘Documenting the Costs of Slavery’, 
Professor Feagin, developing on Randall Robinson’s The Debt: What America Owes to Blacks 
(2000), argues that, in similar fashion to the way Europe benefited from slavery, ‘today … 
prosperity, long life expectancies and high standard of living of white Americans are significantly 
rooted in centuries of exploitation and impoverishment of African Americans and other 
Americans of Colour’ (Feagin 2004: 50). Analysing various and wide-ranging estimates of the 
potential financial cost of nearly 250 years of institutionalised slavery and nearly 400 years of 
racial oppression, which he equates with ‘theft and ill-gotten gains’ in the US, Feagin concludes: 
 
… Even by rough calculations, the sum total of the worth of all the black labor stolen by 
whites through the means of legal slavery, legal segregation, and contemporary racial 
discrimination is truly staggering – many trillions of dollars. The worth of all that labor, 
taking into account lost interest over time and putting it in today’s dollars, is perhaps in 
the range of $5 [trillion] to $24 trillion. (Feagin 2004: 55) 
 
This rough estimate is extraordinary in the following two senses. In the first instance, the upper 
end of the indicated range is, coincidentally perhaps, roughly equivalent to the level of US 
National Debt today and would double the latter, were it to be treated as debt.42 This unpaid 
debt detracts, according to Nietzsche’s logic, from the reality and the worth of society’s 
achievements since neither value, nor worth can ultimately be stolen or created from theft.  
The second is that Nietzsche’s verdict on Feagin’s recommendations that, consistent 
with the notion of the ‘ever expanding social justice’, considerable reparations ought to be made 
in compensation (Ibid.: 81), financial compensation alone would not extinguish the debt, which 
is not financial in nature.  
The real extent of the dependency on slavery, both present and historic, is not yet fully 
acknowledged.43 This problem might be compounded by the failure to have built anything truly 
worthy on its foundations, which could justify slavery as a historical legacy as well as helping to 
find a plausible way forward. Nietzsche’s criteria for constructing the worthy future is ‘to do 
something that would make the thought of life even a hundred times more appealing’ (GS: 
§278). Equally, ‘only he who constructs the future has a right to judge the past’ (UM: UDHL§6): 
‘When the past speaks it always speaks as an oracle: only if you are an architect of the future and 
know the present will you understand it. (Ibid.) 
Slavery in this respect is a reflection of the deep-seated guilt associated with brutality 
under early capitalism, which remains an unpaid debt in the modern conscience. The 
predicament it creates is that the modern society, which has come to abhor exploitation and 
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slavery, remains deeply complicit in them.44 Nietzsche suggests that in such predicament, one’s 
enjoyment of the present would be accompanied by a ‘profound weariness’ as he gazes into the 
future for he knows ‘in advance that his posterity will suffer from the past as he does’ (HAH: 
WS§249). Such weight, liable to increase over time, Nietzsche warns us, is well capable of 
petrifying the modern conscience:  
 
Man … braces himself against the great and ever greater pressure of what is past: it 
pushes him down or bends him sideways, it encumbers his steps as a, dark, invisible 
burden which he can sometimes appear to disown and which in traffic with his fellow 
men he is only too glad to disown (UM: UDHL§1). 
 
This invisible burden, however, also contains a radicalising and self-destructive nexus 
(BGE§242). Left to its own devices, it may lead to a scenario where the ineradicable logic of 
exploitation would turn against its most ardent deniers, who would become its new target: 
‘equality of rights could all too easily be changed into inequality and in violating rights’ (BGE: 
§212).45  
In this context, Klossowski suggests that Nietzsche’s analysis anticipated the critical 
juncture where ‘the thought of the Vicious Circle will become … intolerable’ (Klossowski 
1969:160). As Gianni Vattimo perceptively observes in Nihilism and Emancipation: 
 
If we do not want – as indeed we cannot, except at the risk of terrible wars of extinction 
– to give way to the temptation of resurgent fundamentalisms grounded in race, religion, 
or even the defence of individual national cultures against invasion by ‘foreigners’, we 
will have to imagine a humanity with at least some of the characteristics of Nietzsche’s 
U ̈bermensch (Vattimo 2003: Nihilism and Emancipation, 55). 
 
Nietzsche urges us to think about ‘the configuration of society without melancholy’ (NF-
1871:10[1]). This requires reflecting on the forms of subordination that would be commensurate 
with the task of ‘the ‘preservation of life and the enhancement of its value’ (TAC: §7) in a 
manner that would promise and guarantee ‘life a future’ (TAC: §58).  
At the same time, however, Nietzsche’s analysis posits a significant challenge: it is only 
when ‘the slave-like valuations’, which over the centuries have presided over the most abhorrent 
forms of the ‘slaves’ slavery’, have been overturned that a different meaning and understanding 
of slavery might become possible (NF-1884:25[174], [211]). Without finding new modalities of 
subordination, which would entail a wholesale revaluation of values, ‘a host of the most 
astonishing operations will no longer be capable of achievement and the world will be the 
poorer’ (HAH: I, §441). Nietzsche insists that in order to gain mastery over slavery and to 
exploit it, to get to the position wherefrom exploitation, as an irreducible existential attribute, 
could itself be exploited, directed and bent to one’s will, it is imperative to be inserted into the 
very thick of it (NF-1881:11[221]).  
These considerations merit inviting Nietzsche into the current debate on slavery as part 
of the broader conversation on development and inequality. Nietzsche’s discussion raises 
probing questions, which challenge our perceptions of slavery and urge us to stop trivialising the 
thorny and uncomfortable issues out of the conversation. I have argued that Nietzsche’s critique, 
considered through the prism of political anthropology, compels us not to be so blasé as to 
believe that exploitation and slavery are relics of the past, or that we live in a classless society. 
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Instead, Nietzsche challenges us to recognise the impact which slavery in different forms – both 
past and present – continues to make on the world. Nietzsche’s own scrutiny of slavery 
translates into a pressing call for reconsidering our conditions of existence with the view to 
finding commensurate ways of living with each other in the world. Growing empirical evidence 
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